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TURNOVER AND REGULATION:
THE CHILEAN PENSION FUND INDUSTRY
Solange Berstein Alejandro Micco
Banco Central de Chile Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo
Resumen
Este artículo presenta un modelo de competencia con productos diferenciados y costos de
búsqueda. En este modelo las firmas cobran un precio por sobre sus costos marginales. Este
margen positivo constituye un incentivo a robar clientes de firmas competidoras. Con este objeto,
las firmas contratan agentes de venta que contactan personalmente a los consumidores para
cambiarlos de una firma a otra, e incluso ofrecen recompensas a quienes aceptan cambiarse. Estos
premios o recompensas pueden ser interpretados como una rebaja al precio para clientes de la
competencia, lo que sería una forma de discriminación de precios en este contexto. El modelo se
aplica a la industria chilena de administradoras de fondos de pensiones.  En 1995 había mas de un
agente de ventas por cada doscientos clientes con una rotación entre administradoras de más de un
50 por ciento. Esta alta rotación estaba asociada a elevados costos, y las autoridades reaccionaron
imponiendo restricciones a los cambios de administradora en el año 1997. La sección empírica de
este artículo analiza el rol de los agentes de venta en esta industria y los efectos de las restricciones
implementadas en 1997.
Abstract
We study price competition in a model with differentiated products and searching costs. In this
model firms charge a price above marginal costs. This positive mark-up gives firms incentive to
steal consumers from their rivals. For this purpose, firms hire sales agents that contact customers
personally to switch them from one firm to another and offer rewards to the switchers. These
rewards can be interpreted as a price cut to rival's customers, which is a form of price discrimination
in this model. This model is applied to the Chilean pension funds industry. In 1995 there was more
than one sales agent per two hundred customers with a turnover between Pension Fund
Administrators of more than 50 percent. This high turnover was associated with large costs, and the
authorities reacted by imposing restrictions to switching by the end of 1997. The empirical section
of the paper attempts to analyze the role of sales agents in this industry and the impact of such
restrictions.
___________________
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Direct advertisement and telemarketing are practices commonly used in many
industries. This is usually the case with subscription goods, like long distance
telephone service, life insurance, cable TV, credit cards, and pension fund
administration. In general, these are all products where once you choose a
brand you stay with it unless you take a speciﬁc action that has some costs
to switch to another one, so there are searching or switching costs in these
industries. It seems that in this environment ﬁrms have chosen to compete
by directly contacting potential customers in person, by telephone or by mail.
We study a model in which ﬁrms can compete in price and use sales
agents, and there are searching costs. In equilibrium, searching costs or
product diﬀerentiation allow ﬁrms to charge a price above marginal costs.
This positive mark-up gives ﬁrms incentive to steal consumers from their
rivals. For this purpose, ﬁrms hire sales agents that contact customers per-
sonally to switch them from one ﬁrm to another and oﬀer rewards to the
switchers (price-cuts or bribes). This is a way of price discriminating in this
model.
This model is applied to the Chilean pension funds industry. In this case,
we observe a strong correlation between the number of sales agents hired and
turnover. In 1995 there was more than one sales agent per two hundred cus-
tomers with a turnover between Pension Fund Administrators of more than
50 percent per year. During this year, sales agent wages accounted for more
than 35 percent of ﬁrms’ total costs. The empirical evidence shown in this
paper supports the fact that sales agents increase turnover. Moreover, our
results suggest that sales agents reduce the sensitivity of consumers to prod-
uct characteristics, which implies that sales agents not only reduce searching
costs, but also induce switching through gifts (bribes) or some other mecha-
nism.
The next section reviews the related literature. Then in Section 3 we solve
ad i ﬀerentiated products’ model and study the welfare eﬀects of the existence
1of sales agents and bribes. Section 4 presents some empirical evidence for
the Chilean pension industry. Section 5 gives our conclusions.
2 Literature Review
T h em o d e ld e v e l o p e di nt h i sp a p e rc a nb et h o u g h to fa sa ne x t e n s i o no fe i t h e r
Klemperer (1995) or Diamond (1971).1 In the former paper, assuming an
homogenous good, Klemperer shows that a suﬃciently large switching cost
induces ﬁrms to charge the monopoly price and induces costumers to buy
from the same ﬁrms that they did in the past. Similar results can be found
based on Diamond (1971).2 In this paper, consumers are uncertain about
prices and must compare the cost of searching further with the expected
gain from ﬁnding a better price. Under the assumptions of both papers, the
unique equilibrium is: all ﬁrms charge the monopoly price and no customer
pays the searching or switching cost, and therefore there is no consumer
turnover.
Chen (1997) extends Klemperer’s model by allowing product diﬀeren-
tiation and consumer poaching. In his model, in equilibrium discounts are
oﬀered to all newcomers through a diﬀerent price. Extensions to Chen (1997)
can be found in Shaﬀer and Zhang (2000), where demand is generalized by
allowing customers to diﬀe ri nt e r m so fl o y a l t y . T h i sm o d e lr e s u l t si nd i s -
counts oﬀered to loyal consumers instead of newcomers. Another extension is
presented in Taylor (2000), in which there are multiple periods and random
switching costs. Chen’s results hold in this last model.
In an alternative setup Fundenberg and Tirole (2000) study the case of dif-
ferentiated products and customer poaching. They analyze two polar cases:
consumer preferences are ﬁxed or independent over time, where price dis-
crimination in the second period is based on information about preferences
1The model is an extension of example 0) in Klemperer (1995).
2For more recent research on the same issues, see Levine and Lippman (1995) and Stahl
(1996).
2that consumers reveal in the ﬁrst period. They ﬁnd that if preferences are
ﬁxed, consumer poaching results in ineﬃcient switching. However, with in-
dependent preferences over time, there is no basis for price discrimination in
the second period, so there is no eﬃciency problem in this case.
The diﬀerentiated goods model presented in this paper considers a case
between the two extreme situations considered by Fundenberg and Tirole
in terms of preferences. We assume there are both horizontal and vertical
diﬀerentiations, where the latter is uncertain and changes over time. We also
consider the existence of switching costs and that the discounts to newcomers
can be done through sales agents. Under this setup, sales agents produce
some eﬃciency gain in the sense that they reduce searching costs, but at
the same time the existence of positive mark-ups induces the ﬁrms to have
too many sales agents and bribes (stealing eﬀect), which implies ineﬃcient
switching as well.
In our setup, even though ﬁrms can charge diﬀerent prices across cus-
tomers, in equilibrium ﬁrms charge the same price to all customers and only
discriminate through gifts (price-cuts or bribes) to consumers visited by sales
agents. Firms take advantage of sales agent technology to steal customers
from their rivals.
3 A Model with Searching/Switching Costs
and Sales Agents
In order to study the eﬀect of sales agents in a market with searching and/or
switching cost we must have a model with two characteristics: (1) a dynam-
ics set up with at least two periods; (2) a technology that allows sales agents
to either reduce searching/switching costs or/and to discriminate between
visited customers and the others. Product diﬀerentiation is not required to
analyze sales agents; however, when there is product diﬀerentiation, turnover
induced by sales agents may improve welfare. This is not the case for homo-
3geneous goods.
In this section we describe a two period duopoly model with diﬀerentiated
products, searching/switching costs and sales agents. Products are diﬀerent
in two ways. On the one hand, ﬁrms have diﬀerent characteristics like loca-
tion and services, which are treated as elements of horizontal diﬀerentiation
and analyzed using a Hotelling approach. On the other hand, we will as-
sume an element of vertical diﬀerentiation which is subject to uncertainty.
Ex-ante, both ﬁrms have the same expected product quality, however some
information about quality is revealed during the second period (horizontal
diﬀerentiation appears), after prices are set but before customers choose.
This can be the case of mutual funds or pension funds in which ﬁrms get un-
certain rates of return on their investments and information about expected
return is revealed over time.
The two ﬁrms a and b are located at the two extremes of product charac-
teristic. Consumers are distributed uniformly between the two ﬁrms with a
ﬁxed density equal to 1. At the beginning of period 1, all consumers seek to
maximize the discounted sum of their expected one-period-utility (u). Each
period consumers derive gross surplus R which is a function of product qual-
ity, and they incur in a "transportation cost" of t per unit of distance from
the ﬁrm, where t represents the sensitivity of consumers to horizontal product
characteristics. The expected one-period-utility is:
E(uij)=E(Rj)+tdi,j (1)
where E, i and j represent the expected operator, the consumer, and the
ﬁrm, respectively. di,j is the distance between ﬁrm j and consumer i in the
product characteristic space. Rj is the gross surplus of being with ﬁrm j.
For simplicity we assume that in the ﬁrst period both ﬁrms have the same
gross surplus, and in the second period, after some information about product
quality is revealed, the expected gross surplus can be either R+∆R/2 in case
the ﬁrm has a high expected quality and R−∆R/2 if otherwise. Both states
4of nature have the same probability (1/2). For mutual or pension funds ∆R
stands for the diﬀerence in expected rates of return.
At the beginning of the second period, a fraction σa of consumers have
already purchased from ﬁrm a and thus they have a switching cost (θSC) to
buy from ﬁrm b in the current period, and due to some searching costs only
af r a c t i o ns of customers will re-evaluate their product choice in the second
period, while the others will buy from the same ﬁrm without any cost-beneﬁt
analysis. Similarly, the complementary fraction σb of consumers have bought
from ﬁrm b in the past, and they have a switching cost to buy from a as well
as a searching cost.
Each period, prices are chosen simultaneously and non-cooperatively by
ﬁrms before transactions take place. Firms are forced to have a single price
for all customers each period. Both ﬁrms face the same marginal cost equal
to 0.
In the second period, after prices are set, sales agents have the ability
to reduce the switching costs and to eliminate the searching cost of the cus-
tomers they visit. Moreover, they can oﬀer a price discount (B) to induce
the switch (price discrimination).3 These agents are hired by the ﬁrms and
paid a wage w. Firms decide the number of sales agents for the second period
and at the same time they ﬁx their prices. The probability (lb) that an old
customer of ﬁrm a receives a sales agent from ﬁrm b in the second period is
given by: 4
3We assume that the one price-policy is not enforceable when the transaction take place
directly between the customer and the sales agent.
4Following Tirole (1989), this equation assumes that sales agents are sent randomly to
workers in the other ﬁrm. So if there are (Mσo
a) workers in the rival ﬁr m ,e a c ho ft h e mh a s
a probability 1/(Mσo
a) of receiving a given sales agents. Deﬁning Ab, as the total number
of sales agents sent by ﬁrm b to customers in ﬁrm a, workers’ probability of not getting a
sales agents at all is:







Therefore, the cost that a fraction l of workers in ﬁrm, a receives at least one sales agent
is:
wAb = −wMσo






where Ab is the number of sales agents that ﬁrm b has per worker in the
system.
Figure 1 shows the time line of events in the model. At the beginning of
t =1ﬁrms set prices for the ﬁrst period and then customers choose ﬁrms
(products). At the beginning of t =2ﬁrms set prices and the number of sales
agents for the second period, then just after the signal about ﬁrms’ quality
is revealed, sales agents visit customers, who decide to stay or to switch at
the end of the period.
Figure1:The Time Line of Events in the Model
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 48 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 47 6 4 4 4 4 4 4 48 4 4 4 4 4 4 47 6




) 1 (    
1 ,
                                                                     
firms   Choose               Customers  visit                        observed   is                  
Customers                   Agents   Sales           quality      of   Signal                   
_________ __________ __________ __________ __________ __________  
firms   Choose                                      

















The next sections solves for the symmetric Subgame Perfect Nash equilib-
rium of the model. The lack of sales agents and the symmetry between ﬁrms
imply that, for any symmetric ﬁrst-period-price, ﬁrms will end up having the
same market shares, and customers will be in the ﬁrm that better ﬁts their
tastes in terms of the ﬁrms’ horizontal characteristics at the end of the ﬁrst
period. This result allows us to mainly focus on the analysis of the second
period.
To stress the role of sales agents in the model, in particular how they
allow ﬁrms to discriminate between customers, section 3.1 initially solves the
model for the case of a homogeneous product. In this case, consumers are
In the model M and the number of visit per sales agents are normalized to 1.
6not sensitive to horizontal product characteristics (t =0 )a n dﬁrms’ products
have the same expected quality in both periods (∆R =0 ). Section 3.2 solves
for the case of diﬀerentiated products.
3.1 Homogeneous Products
This section solves for the equilibrium price and the level of sales agents
in a two-period duopoly market, in which products are homogeneous and
consumers have both switching (θSC) and searching costs (1 − s). The
main conclusion of this section is that, in equilibrium, it is possible to have
consumer turnover in the second period (with symmetric cross-ﬂows) even
though ﬁrms provide homogeneous goods and charge the same price. In this
case all turnover is ineﬃcient (neither consumer surplus nor ﬁrms’ proﬁts
are increased), and it is completely induced by discrimination between cur-
rent and potential customers. Sales agents’ wages and switching costs paid
dissipate the ﬁrms’ monopolistic rent.
At the end of the ﬁrst period, no matter which is the equilibrium price,
half of the consumers purchase from ﬁrm a and half from b. For any given
second-period prices Pa and Pb, a consumer who decides to re-evaluate his/her
choice and is not visited by a sales agent will switch from ﬁrm a to ﬁrm b in
t h es e c o n dp e r i o di fa n do n l yi f : 5
R − Pb − θSC >R− Pa (3)
The same condition for a consumer who is visited by a sales agent is:
R − Pb − θ
0
SC + Ba >R− Pa (4)
where θ
0
SC accounts for the switching cost faced by a consumer who received
5For simplicity, in the paper we do not allow ﬁrms to charge a diﬀerent price to all rival
customers. In our setup, it is easy to prove that although ﬁrms were allowed to charge
diﬀerent prices to current and potential customers, in all equilibria in which these prices
are charged they are the same.
7a sales agent (θ
0
SC <θ SC), and Ba is the price discount oﬀered by sales agents
to induce the switch from ﬁrm a to b.
Given these conditions, and assuming that ﬁrms cannot induce switches
by cutting equilibrium-prices to all customers at a proﬁt, and that sales

















where w represents sales agents’ wage (<θ SC).T h e ﬁrst term is the
second period income that come from customers choosing ﬁrm a in both
periods. The second term is the income generated from customers stolen
from ﬁrm b using a price discount. The last term is the wage of sales agents.
Firms maximize their second period proﬁts in two steps: ﬁrst they choose
simultaneously the price and the number of sales agents, and then the price
discount they would like to oﬀer through sales agents to induce a switch
(given their rivals’ price).
Proposition 1 If (R − c) <θ SC ,6,7,8 the symmetric Nash equilibrium in
price discounts, prices and sales agents is:
B
∗
h = Pj − Ph + θ
0





b = R (7)

























7Alternatively, we can assume a searching cost a la Diamond (71). In his model,
Diamond assumes that customers have to incur a ﬁxed cost to see the other ﬁrms’ prices.
Under this assumption, the unique equilibrium is: all ﬁrms charge the reservation price
(R) and no customer pays the cost to monitor the other ﬁrms’ prices. In this case, the
equilibrium with sales agents is the same as in the case described in the text.
8Under this condition, proposition 1 holds as a Nash Equilibrium even though ﬁrms
















for h = a,b (8)
Proof. Straight forward from ﬁrms’ proﬁt function.













Firms choose the monopoly price (R) and hire sales agents as a function






. In equilibrium, all ﬁrms’
new customers are stolen by sales agents who oﬀer a discount to visited
customers (B = θ
0
SC). In equilibrium cross ﬂows exist even though the good
is homogeneous and ﬁrms charge the same price. Customer turnover is:
Turnover= l
∗ (10)
Turnover is composed of customer ﬂows from ﬁrm a to ﬁrm b (1/2 l∗)
and from ﬁrm b to ﬁrm a (1/2 l∗). All turnover is induced by sales agents
who allow ﬁrms to price discriminate between current customers (high price:
R) and rival customers (low price to induce them to switch: R − θ
0
SC). In
equilibrium there is turnover without net ﬂows between ﬁrms (i.e. without a
change in market shares).
Appendix A solves this model assuming a long horizon (T periods, where
T tends to inﬁnity). We ﬁnd that, as in the previous case, ﬁrms charge the
monopoly price (in all periods) and the number of sales agents is increasing
in the mark-up charged to new consumers. In the steady state, ﬁrms’ market
shares only depend on their relative marginal costs, which in Appendix A are
assumed to be diﬀerent from each other. The higher the relative marginal
cost, the lower the market share. Once ﬁrms reach the steady state shares,
there are no net ﬂo w sa n y m o r e ,b u tt h e r ei ss t i l lt u r n o v e r .
Finally, it is important to stress again that with a homogeneous good,
all turnover is ineﬃcient from a social point of view. There is no social gain
9from switching a customer from one ﬁrm to another (homogeneous good),
but there is a cost. Sales agents and switching costs paid dissipate some
of the monopoly rents. If possible, ﬁrms would like to commit to have no
sales agents at all, but that is not sustainable in equilibrium. In the Pareto
optimal case there will be neither sales agents nor turnover.
3.2 Diﬀerentiated Products
In this subsection we relax the assumption of homogeneous good and allow
horizontal and vertical diﬀerentiation (∆R>0 and t>0 ), however for
simplicity we only allow for searching costs (0 <s<1 and θSC =0 ).
In the previous subsection all turnover is ineﬃcient. However, when there
is product diﬀerentiation, turnover induced by sales agents may be welfare
improving. A change in product characteristics, or consumers’ tastes, might
induce switching; nevertheless, the existence of searching costs can prevent
part or all of this switching from happening. To highlight this point, we ﬁrst
assume that sales agents cannot oﬀer price discount (B =0 )a n dt h e yo n l y
make customers re-evaluate with probability one their ﬁrst period choices.
Afterwards, we will solve a model in which sales agents are allowed to oﬀer
price discounts to convince customers to switch. In both cases there is excess
turnover compared to the social optimum.
As in the case of homogeneous goods, at the end of the ﬁrst period, half
of the consumers purchased from ﬁrm a. In this case, customers are in the
ﬁrm that better ﬁts their tastes in terms of product horizontal characteristics.
Therefore, in the second period, ﬁrms maximize the following expected proﬁt
function:




























The ﬁrst term in equation [11] is ﬁrm a’s income when it is the expected
high quality ﬁrm multiplied by the probability of being in this state of the
nature (1/2). The second term is the income in the case where the ﬁrm is
the expected low quality and ﬁnally the last term is the sales agents’ wages.
Proposition 2 Under the previous assumptions (B =0 ), the symmetric
Nash equilibrium in prices is: P∗ = t
l∗(1−s)+s if l∗ is positive and P ∗ = t
s if
otherwise.













































if la (s − 1) 6= s
∅ if la (s − 1) = s
As s is between [0,1] and la is between [0,1] la (s − 1) is always diﬀerent




As is usual in this type of models, the equilibrium prices will be higher
when the transportation cost t is higher. However, notice that if 0 <s<1
and 0 <l<1, the price is even higher than the transportation cost. In this
model, the existence of searching costs is giving the ﬁrms additional mar-
ket power, which implies higher mark-ups than in the traditional Hotelling
model. On the other hand, the presence of sales agents reduces the eﬀects
of this additional source of market power, lowering the price. In the extreme
cases where there are no searching costs, s =1 , or all consumers are visited
by a sales agent, l =1 , we go back to the Hotelling model, where P = t.
If there are no sales agents the price will go up to t
s. Ah i g h e rs is related
to lower searching costs, recall that s is the proportion of consumers that
re-evaluate their decision without being visited by a sales agent. If there are
no searching costs, everyone should be re-evaluating this decision.
Proposition 3 Under the previous assumptions (B =0 ), the symmetric
Nash equilibrium for sales agents gives us the following proportion of con-
sumers visited by sales agents: l∗ =1− 2wt
P∗(1−s)∆R, if positive and 0 otherwise.
Considering the equilibrium prices this proportion is: l∗ =1− 1
(1−s)(1+ ∆R
2w )if
positive and 0 if otherwise.
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− ∆Rt
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∅ if s =1∧ 2sw 6= ∆R(1 − s)
We observe that the proportion of consumers reached by sales agents will
be lower if wages that the ﬁrm has to pay them are higher. Notice that if
there are no searching costs, s =1 , the equilibrium number of sales agents is
zero.
3.2.1 Model with sales agents oﬀering price discount
In this section, we allow sales agents to oﬀer price-discounts to visited cus-
tomers (B>0). The results imply that, in this context, turnover is higher
than before and that in equilibrium, even if there are no searching costs there
is a positive number of sales agents. The intuition for this result is that the
presence of positive mark-ups makes it proﬁtable for ﬁrms to steal customers
from competitors, inducing ﬁrms to hire sales agents to oﬀer price-discount
to visited consumers to switch.
Sales agents visit customers after the signal about ﬁrms quality is re-
vealed, therefore the price-discount oﬀered will depend on the quality of the
ﬁrms they represent.










































where Bij is the price discount oﬀered by ﬁrm i when j is the high ex-
pected quality ﬁrm, for i = a,b and j = a,b.
Proposition 4 Assuming {t>∆R},9 the Nash equilibrium in price dis-
counts is: Baa = Pa −
∆R+Pb
2 , Bab = Pa +
∆R−Pb
2 , Bbb = Pb − ∆R+Pa
2 ,
Bba = Pb + ∆R−Pa
2 .
Proof. This result comes from the ﬁrst order conditions for proﬁt maximiza-
tion with respect to Bij, for i = a,b and j = a,b.
Price discounts oﬀered by sales agents depend on ﬁxed prices and they
are higher if the ﬁrm is the one with low expected quality (return).
























Proposition 5 Under the previous assumptions, the symmetric subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium in prices is: P ∗ = t
l∗(1−s)+s.
9The suﬃcient condition is t
l∗(1−s)+s > ∆R.
14Proof. Follows from the ﬁrst order conditions as in the previous proofs.
Equilibrium prices expressed as a function of the equilibrium level of l,
are the same in the previous model, following the same intuition as before.
Proposition 6 Under the previous assumptions, the symmetric subgame
perfect Nash equilibrium for sales agents gives us the following probability
of being visited by a sales agent: l∗ =1− 2wt
(1−s)∆RP∗+1
2(∆R−P∗)2,i fp o s i t i v ea n d
0 if otherwise.
Proof. Follows from the ﬁrst order conditions as in the previous proofs.
In this setup it can be easily shown that the equilibrium number of sales
agents is higher than in the case with no price discounts. To see the proof no-
tice that the equation for the equilibrium level of l is similar to the one in the
previous model, but includes an additional positive term in the denominator,
which makes l higher than before.10
There are two interesting extreme cases to analyze. The ﬁrst is a situation
w h e r et h e r ea r en os e a r c h i n gc o s t s( s =1 ) . In this case, the probability of
being visited by a sales agent is: l∗ =1− 4wt
(∆R−t)2, if positive. Recall that
in the previous model, with no searching costs, there were no sales agents
hired because all customers re-evaluate their choice in the second period.
The second interesting case is a situation where no expected diﬀerences are
expected in product quality in the second period (∆R =0 ). In this case,
although there is no change in ﬁrms relative-characteristics between the ﬁrst
and the second period, ﬁrms may still have incentives to hire sales agents.
This is because they can steal customers using price discounts (l∗ =1− 4wt
P∗2).
10Proof. Without loss of generality, assume ∆R =1and a =( 1− P∗)2. From the
equilibrium with bribes and without bribes we have:
1 − lB =2 t w
(s+lB(1−s))a+t(1−s) (s + lB (1 − s))
1 − lNB =2 w
1−s (s + lNB(1 − s))
Comparing these two equations we have that if lB ≤ lNB then 1−lB ≤ 1 −lNB, which
is a contradiction. So it must be that lB >l NB.
15Recall that in the previous model, in this case there were no sales agents
hired because all customers were already in the ﬁrm that better suited their
tastes at the beginning of the second period.
I nt h ec a s ew h e r es a l e sa g e n t sm a yo ﬀer price discounts, their role is
not only to induce switching by reducing searching costs, but also to steal
customers away from rivals by using gifts (prices discounts). Given this new
instrument, ﬁrms have higher incentives to hire sales agents.
3.2.2 Social Planner and Equilibrium Comparison
An interesting benchmark for the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is the
constrained Pareto optimal solution. This solution is obtained by maximiz-
ing the gains from switches from the low to the high-expected-return ﬁrm,
m i n u st h es a l e sa g e n t sc o s t . 11 The social planner is restricted to use the
same technology as competitive ﬁrms; in other words, the social planner has
speciﬁc sales agents for each type of switch (from a to b and from b to a).
These sales agents are chosen before the state of the nature is realized. If
ﬁrm a has the higher expected rate of return, the social planner only switches
customers from ﬁrm b to a, and for whom it is convenient to switch according
to their preferences (These are the ones between [1/2,1/2+∆R/2t]).
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i = a,b (16)
11It is worth noting to note that the fee level does not aﬀect the social surplus because
in any case all the market is covered (In Chile, pension fund saving is mandatory).
12This corresponds to the change of social beneﬁt due to sales agents.
16The constrained Pareto optimal number of sales agents (2A(lSP)) is smaller
than the one in the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which sales agents
are not allowed to oﬀer price discounts (2A(lNB)),13 and therefore to the one
in the case in which sales agents are allowed to oﬀer price discounts (2A(lB)).
14
Turnover, under the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which sales
agents are not allowed to oﬀer discount (TurnoverNB) is the sum of the eﬃ-
cient turnover, the ﬁrst two terms in eq.17, plus the excess turnover induced













In the case where sales agents are allowed to bribe consumers (oﬀer dis-
counts), turnover is even higher and it can be expressed as the sum of three
terms: i) the constrained Pareto optimal, ii) the excess turnover generated
by a higher number of sales agents than the social optimum, and iii) the com-
pletely ineﬃcient switching from the high to the low expected return ﬁrm,



































13Proof. lSP <l NB : We have assumed for an interior solution that t
∆R > 1 ⇒ 1
2w+1 <







3t ⇒ 1 − w
(1−s)2 1




14Proof. lSP <l B : We have assumed for an interior solution that t
∆R > 1 ⇒
t/∆R
l(1−s)+s > 1 ⇒ 4
t/∆R










⇐⇒ 1 − 4tw
2(1−s)∆R t
l(1−s)+s+(∆R− t
l(1−s)+s)2 > 1 − 8wt
3(1−s)
174 Application to the Chilean Pension System
4.1 The Chilean Pension Fund Industry
In recent years many countries have experimented with reforms of their social
security systems. In general we observe a switch from Pay As You Go (PAYG)
systems to Fully Funded (FF) ones with individual accounts. At the same
time, the management of these retirement funds has been given to private
ﬁrms instead of staying with the government. This change has led to the
development of a new industry in these countries. This new industry has
certain distinct features, and the countries that have implemented a Pension
Fund Reform are still looking for the appropriate regulation to ensure eﬃcient
service.
A feature that has remained is the compulsory nature of the contributions.
In Chile, workers contribute 10% of their taxable income to the Pension Fund
of their choice, and are allowed to switch providers as desired. However, until
1988 regulations required workers to physically go to an agency of the PFA
(Pension Fund Administrator) in order to transfer the Fund to this PFA. So
it was not easy for a worker to transfer their funds to some other manager,
even with sales agents.
In 1988, Chile eliminated the provision actually walking in to the man-
ager’s agency to request a transfer. From that year on the number of trans-
fers increased signiﬁcantly, the turnover went up to almost 50% in 1996. In
the early eighties, there were fewer than 2 sales agents for every 1,000 con-
tributors, and in 1996 there were more than 6 sales agents for every 1,000
contributors (See Figure 2). This also implied a signiﬁcant increase in the
18costs of servicing the workers.




















Source : Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de Pensiones. Chile.
In fact, sales agents began giving out gifts (bribes) to contributors to en-
courage them to transfer their funds, and commercialization expenses grad-
ually become an important part of the total expenses for the Pension Fund
managers. For instance, the so called ”Chilean system” has been criticized
for its high administrative costs.16,17 The largest share of this burden is ac-
counted by advertising and promotion eﬀorts. In 1995 the number of sales
agents exceeded one per two hundred workers and their wages amounted to
around 33 percent of total costs.18,19According to some estimates, adminis-
trative costs may be reducing retirement beneﬁts by as much as 20 percent20.
16James et al (1998) and Diamond (1999) discuss the administrative costs for diﬀerent
types of pension systems.
17AIOS (1999) shows administrative costs for the seven Latin-American countries that
have a funded system with individual accounts.
18E.James, G.Ferrier, James Smalhout, D.Vittas (1998) shows that marketing costs are
around 50% of total costs in the last years (1995-1998).
19Marketing costs are around 50 percent of total costs in the seven Latin-American
countries with funded pension system with individual accounts. See AIOS (1999).
20E.James, G.Ferrier, James Smalhout, D.Vittas (1998). NBER Conference on Social
Security Dec. 4, 1998.
19A recent amendment to the regulation implied additional paperwork to
process a transfer.21 The main purpose of this measure was to lower commer-
cialization expenses and limit transfers. In fact, the number of sales agents
dropped from 17,448 in 1997 to 6,434 in 1998, a drop of 63%. The num-
ber of transfers also dropped from 1,574,189 to 696,164, a 55% decrease in
the same period. Nevertheless, commercialization expenses dropped by only
23%. This might be because now every transfer is more valuable for the PFA.
A c c o r d i n gt ot h ea b o v em o d e l s ,s a l e sa g e n t sh a v et w or o l e st op l a yi n
this market. On the one hand, they might be reducing the switching costs
by giving information to consumers about product characteristics that are
valuable. On the other, they might be inducing ineﬃcient switching through
bribes, thereby increasing the administrative cost of the system. This section
provides some empirical evidence about these two roles for sales agents and
the eﬀects of the 1997 reform over customer turnover.
4.2 Empirical Framework and Results
Our empirical framework is derived from the two period model with diﬀeren-
tiated products presented in section 3.2. As in standard multichoice models,
we assume that the consumer one-period-utility is a function of ﬁrms char-








j,t +  i,j (19)
= δ
i
j,t +  
i
j (20)
where i,j and t are the customer, the ﬁrm and the period, respectively.
In addition, Adv, Serv, F and R represent ﬁrm j advertising, service, fee and
21Upon the change in regulation, in addition to the aﬃliate’s signature, sales agents
require a copy of both customer ID and the last statement of his/her PFA to formalize
the switch. See Circular NU 998, Superintendencia de Administradoras de Fondos de
Pensiones.
20expected return, respectively. The fee is equal to a ﬁxed fee plus a variable
fee multiplied by customer i’s wage. The expected return is equal to the ﬁrm
j expected return multiplied by the amount that i has in his/her individual
account. Finally,   is the idiosyncratic valuation.
Following section 3.2, we assume that at the beginning of period t0,a l l
customers are in the ﬁrms that better suits their tastes. Between t0 and t
ﬁrms characteristic change and sales agents visit customers. These two facts
induce switches among customers.
Let there be only two ﬁrms, without sales agents and focus only in a
group of customers with similar wages and funds in their accounts. In this









































j is the share of type i customers in ﬁrm j. Mi is the number of
type i customers in the market. ∆ represents the change between t0 and t.
The net ﬂow of type i customers from h to j is composed by clients that are
now willing to be in ﬁrm j and chose h at t0 (the last term in equation [21]).
Due to searching costs only a fraction s of these consumers re-evaluate their
choice in t.U s i n gaﬁrst-order Taylor expansion we obtain equation [22].
Including sales agents that eliminate searching costs and could oﬀer some












































































where lj is the probability that a customer from ﬁrm h receives a sales
agent from ﬁrm j. Bi
j is the gift or price cut oﬀered by sales agents from j
to induce customer i from h to switch. The ﬁr s tt e r mi ne q u a t i o n[ 2 3 ]r e p r e -
sents the fraction of customers who switch by themselves. This percentage
is higher, the lower the searching cost and the number of sales agents. The
second and third terms represent customers who switch after they have re-
ceived a sales agent from ﬁrms j and h, respectively. Sales agents change





is larger the higher the probability to be contacted by a sales agents (lj,t+lh,t)
and the higher the searching costs (1 − s). If sales agents give information
about ﬁrms’ characteristics, the eﬀect should be an increase in sensitivity to
these characteristics. However, sales agents may oﬀer price cuts (B)w h i c h
may be a function of relative fees and returns, reducing ﬂows’ sensitivity to
changes in ﬁrms characteristics. This is something that we will test in this
section.
For simplicity, we assume that sales agents go randomly to any customer
in the market. Using a ﬁrst order Taylor approximation we have that the





where Aj represents ﬁrm j’s sales agents, M the total number of customers
in the market and αA the number of visit per sales agents.
Finally, to compute the observed net ﬂows between h and j we add up
the diﬀerent types of customers in the market. Therefore the observed net































t is the fraction of customers that are type i in the whole market.
From equation [26] we obtain our empirical model:
NFhj,t
Mt u βag Advhj,t + βs] Servhj,t + βF e F
i
hj,t + βR e R
i
hj,t








































βa := sα a
βsa,a := αA (1 − s) αa
βsa := αAB
Equation [27] assumes that all sales agents oﬀe rt h es a m eg i f t( B),b u t
actually it may be a function of ﬁrms’ characteristics (or changes thereof).
In this case, the variables that interact sales agents and changes in ﬁrms
characteristics (βsa,∗)w o u l dr e ﬂect both: i) the reduction in searching costs
and ii) the size of the gifts oﬀered by sales agents. These two eﬀects have
opposite signs. For an increase in expected return, the reduction in searching
costs implies that the interacted term has to be positive, but after this im-
provement sales agents may oﬀer a smaller gifts to induce a switch implying
an e g a t i v es i g nf o rt h es a m et e r m .
Our empirical set up assumes that workers’ choice in t0 is fully driven by
a change in PFAs’ characteristics during this period. In reality this is not
true because some might have been in the wrong (not preferred) PFA for
23some months because of searching costs. Besides, some customers switch to a
less preferred ﬁrm after being visited by a sales agent, who could have oﬀered
them a gift. Therefore, they might want to move back to the preferred PFA
as soon as they can. To control for the former fact, our variables in t0 are
the simple average of the previous 12 months. Implicitly we are assuming
that a customer in PFA j in t0 re-evaluates his/her choice according to ﬁrms
characteristics for the previous 12 month period.
Table1:Summary Statistics
Whole Sample (obs=1750) Pre-Reform (obs=1020) Post-Reform (obs=442)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
PFAs 10.53 2.56 8 15 13 1.55 8.14 0.38
Contributors in the System 2968428 173010 2682297 3275529 2845276 99979.06 3108091 69531.49
Gross Flows 1958 3607 0 29811 2271 4296 1936 2511
Sales Agents 1111 947 31 3747 1297 1052 672 499
Advertisement (ln) 1 -1.36 1.39 -5.11 0.51 -1.56 1.44 -1.04 1.30
Service (ln) 1 -1.46 0.72 -3.05 -0.15 -1.58 0.74 -1.24 0.66
Fees 7.18 0.55 5.60 9.73 7.36 0.46 6.76 0.54
Return 0.003 0.005 -0.007 0.015 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.007
Net Flows  (Absolute Value) 563 1103 0 12801 694 1334 462 671
Net Flows 0.0 1239 -12801 12801 0.0 1503 0.0 815
Net Flows / Cot. 0.0 0.00043 -0.00453 0.00453 0.0 0.00053 0.0 0.00026
Dif. in sales agents (j-h) 4 0.0 0.00000 -0.00005 0.00005 0.0 0.00001 0.0 0.00001
Rel. Change in Advertising 1 0.0 0.00560 -0.07247 0.07247 0.0 0.00276 0.0 0.01016
Rel. Change in Service  1 0.0 0.00170 -0.01249 0.01249 0.0 0.00114 0.0 0.00252
Rel. Change in Returns 0.0 0.01801 -0.14709 0.14709 0.0 0.01150 0.0 0.02979
Rel. Change in Fees 0.0 0.00294 -0.03191 0.03191 0.0 0.00134 0.0 0.00473
Rel. Change in Fees * wage 0.0 1.054 -10.84037 10.84037 0.0 0.422 0.0 1.696
Note: The whole sample include 15 quarters and the pre-reform and post-reform periods include 6 and 7 quarters, respectively. September and December 1999 are considered 
as transition period.  All mean values for difference variables are zero by construction, variables appear twice with different sign. Our estimations only use flows in one direction . 
1 Advertising and Service expenditures are stock variables in hundreds of millions of 95$ (log). 2 Relatives changes in fees between PFAs are interacted with individual 
wages. 3 The variables are interacted with the sum of sales agents from PFA j and h divided by the total number of contributors in the system. 4 The
diference in the number of sales agents in firm j and h are divided by the total amount of contributors in the system. 5 The post reform period does not 
include Dic. & Mach 1997. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
as transition period.  All mean values for difference variables are zero 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in equation 27
as well as the level values of net and gross ﬂows, advertisement (log), services
(log), fees, expected returns and sales agents. We compute this summary
statistic for the whole sample and for the pre and post-reform periods. As
showed by table 1 and ﬁgure 3, gross ﬂows are high across the whole sample,
but in particular in the pre-reform period. The same is true for the number
of sales agents. In the case of advertising and services expenditures, although
table 1 shows no fall in the mean value, the large reduction in the number
of PFAs in the system (from 13 to 8) implies that the total expenditure in
these items decreased after the reform. Finally, a small fall in the average
24f e ea f t e rt h er e f o r m .





























































































































Gross Inflow Net Inflow Prob. Of Sales Agents Visit
Reform
Table 2a shows equation [27] estimated coeﬃcient using the whole period
(since Dec.95 until Dec.99). The ﬁrst column uses OLS and the second
column shows results when we instrument the level of sales agents with their
values four months before. Given that fees are ﬁx e db yl a ws i xm o n t h si n
advance, we took them as exogenous. Table 2b presents the same regressions
dividing the sample in pre and post-reform periods.
25Table2a
(1) (2)
Rel. Change in Advertising 1 0.023 0.026
(0.014)* (0.015)*
Rel. Change in IT  1 -0.000 -0.002
(0.029) (0.027)
Rel. Change in Returns 0.009 0.007
(0.003)*** (0.003)**
Rel. Change in Fees -0.107 -0.097
(0.032)*** (0.032)***
Rel. Change in Fees  0.000 0.000
   * Individual Wages 2 (0.000) (0.000)
Rel. Change in Advertising -10.993 -15.029
   * Sales Agents h and j 3 (17.149) (17.799)
Rel. Change in IT 3.155 3.382
   * Sales Agents h and j (31.114) (31.677)
Rel. Change in Returns -9.178 -7.399
   * Sales Agents h and j (3.527)*** (3.863)*
Rel. Change in Fees 90.245 82.366
   * Sales Agents h and j (24.079)*** (24.251)***
Dif. in sales agents (j-h) 4 101.138 86.723
(24.463)*** (44.272)*






1 Advertising and IT stocks  are in hundreds of millions of 95$ (log). 2 Relatives changes in fees between PFAs are interacted with individual 
wages. 3 The variables are interacted with the sum of sales agents from PFA j and h divided by the total number of contributors in the system. 4 The
diference in the number of sales agents in firm j and h are divided by the total amount of contributors in the system. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
Our results indicate that the net inﬂow of customers to a given PFA
is positively correlated with sales agents, reduction in relative prices and
higher relative returns. All these coeﬃcients have the expected sign and are
signiﬁcant at a 5% level in most speciﬁcations. Expenditure in advertising
and in services are not signiﬁcant and in some speciﬁcations have not the
expected sign. The evidence supports the claim that sales agents explain a
large portion of the switching between PFAs even after controlling for the
other characteristics. Net ﬂows are also associated with changes on product
characteristics, implying for example that ﬁrms that reduce their relative
prices and/or increase their relative returns attract customers.
Results for the whole sample show that a relative increase in advertising
expenditures increases the net ﬂows to ﬁrm j. For the average ﬁrm and
focusing only on customers that switch by their own will (ﬁrst row), the direct
eﬀect of a 1% increase in ﬁrm j0s advertising stock increases the net ﬂow from
26h to j in around 5 workers, almost a 1% increase in the average cross-ﬁrm
ﬂows (in absolute value). It is worth to note that our measure of change
in relative advertising interacted with sales agents is negative (sixth row).
Sales agents reduce the net ﬂow’s sensitivity to changes in advertising. After
taking into account the eﬀect of sales agents, a 1% increase in advertising
boosts the net ﬂow by only 2.5 workers. These results are not robust to
diﬀerent samples (see Table 2b). As for expenditures in services, Table 2
s h o w st h a ti td o e sn o th a v eas i g n i ﬁcant eﬀect on cross ﬂows, which might
be reﬂecting a problem with our measure of service.
Table 2a shows that an increase in the relative change in ﬁrm j0s expected
returns increases the net ﬂow from h to j. Focusing only on customers that
switch by their own will (third row), a one basic point increase in the expected
return increases the net ﬂow in around 30 workers, a 5% increase in the
average net ﬂows (in absolute value). When the expected return variable is
interacted with sales agents we obtain a negative coeﬃcient (sixth row). Sales
agents reduce the net ﬂow sensitivity to expected return; in other words, the
price cut or gift oﬀered by sales agents take into account the relative change
in expected returns: a decrease in expected return relative to the rival ﬁrm
implies a higher price cut or gift. The net eﬀect of one base point increase
in the expected return boosts the net ﬂow by 6 workers, less than the direct
eﬀect (30 workers). This result supports Proposition [4] in our model.
27Table2b
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Net Flows between PFAs divided by total Contributors in the System 
Rel. Change in Advertising 1 0.003 -0.033 0.044 -0.054
(0.079) (0.013)** (0.087) (0.020)***
Rel. Change in IT  1 0.001 0.009 0.009 0.000
(0.148) (0.019) (0.160) (0.037)
Rel. Change in Returns 0.028 -0.002 0.029 -0.002
(0.011)** (0.002) (0.012)** (0.004)
Rel. Change in Fees -0.244 0.030 -0.272 0.055
(0.108)** (0.051) (0.107)** (0.068)
Rel. Change in Fees  0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000
   * Individual Wages 2 (0.000)*** (0.000) (0.000)*** (0.000)
Rel. Change in Advertising -10.486 58.730 -30.639 100.084
   * Sales Agents h and j 3 (45.875) (21.911)*** (50.796) (36.809)***
Rel. Change in IT 17.756 -2.887 27.975 22.275
   * Sales Agents h and j (102.028) (29.557) (117.575) (56.891)
Rel. Change in Returns -21.035 9.107 -21.262 12.173
   * Sales Agents h and j (7.203)*** (4.817)* (7.553)*** (8.422)
Rel. Change in Fees 139.249 15.843 136.368 33.840
   * Sales Agents h and j (63.120)** (53.340) (69.223)** (71.725)
Dif. in sales agents (j-h) 4 153.601 39.121 201.389 128.346
(34.206)*** (15.154)** (60.417)*** (61.372)**
Dif. in sales agents (j-h) in to  4 -140.989 -21.483 -179.203 -74.369
(30.012)*** (10.074)** (51.520)*** (35.272)**
Observations 522 221 510 221
Sample Pre-reform Post-reform 5 Pre-reform Post-reform 5
IV No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.50 0.19 - -
1 Advertising and IT stocks  are in hundreds of millions of 95$ (log). 2 Relatives changes in fees between PFAs are interacted with individual 
wages. 3 The variables are interacted with the sum of sales agents from PFA j and h divided by the total number of contributors in the system. 4 The
diference in the number of sales agents in firm j and h are divided by the total amount of contributors in the system. 5 The post reform period does not 
include Dic. & Mach 1997. Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
The fourth row shows that a relative increase in ﬁrm j0s fee reduces net
ﬂows. The positive sign in the interacted term with individual’ wages (row 5)
shows that the marginal eﬀect of the fee is decreasing with workers’s wealth
(proxied by their wages). Focusing only on customers that switch by their
own will (rows 4 and 5), a 1% reduction in fees increase the net ﬂow by
around 100 workers. As in the case of expected return, sales agents reduce
the net ﬂow sensitivity to fees (row 9). Sales agents compensate through
gifts the increase in relative fees to induce customers to switch. The whole
eﬀect in net ﬂows of a 1% increase in fees is only 23 workers.
Focusing on sales agents (diﬀerence between the two PFAs), our results
show that net ﬂows are positively correlated with the number of sales agents.
Using the whole sample, two additional sales agents imply an increase in net
ﬂows of one worker. Considering the large standard deviation of this variable
(1300) we have that this is by far the most important determinant of cross
28ﬂows between PFAs.
Our regressions also include the diﬀerence in sales agents in t0.T h i s
term takes into account the fact that maybe some customers are in PFA h
in t0 because they received a sales agents from this PFA in the past. If sales
agents induce shift through gifts or price cuts, a rational customer would be
willing to switch to take advantage of the gifts and decide to come back to
the original PFA later. If this was the case the sign should be negative as is
apparent in our regressions. This is an additional evidence that sale agents
oﬀer gifts or price cuts to induce customers to switch.
Table 2b splits the sample between pre and post reform period. After
the reforms, ﬁrms’ characteristics loose most their predictive power on net
ﬂows. The goodness of ﬁt drops from 50 percent in the pre-reform period
to less than 20 percent after the reform (ﬁrst and second column). The
relative changes in fees and expected returns are signiﬁcant at 1% in the
pre-reform period but fall (in absolute values) to become not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero after the reform. This is true for customers that switch
for themselves (rows 3-5) as well as for the ones visited by sales agents (rows
6-7). The results for advertising and services are either insigniﬁcant or with
unexpected signs.
The previous results show that the 1997 amendment to the regulation,
which implied additional paperwork to be done in order to process a transfer
and a reduction in sales agents eﬀectiveness, reduced net ﬂows sensitive to
changes in ﬁrms characteristic. As expected, this reform seems to increase
customers’ searching/switching costs.
Summing up, our results show that net ﬂows between PFAs are posi-
tively related to increases in expected returns and advertisement, and neg-
ative related to increases in relative fees. The interactions of sales agents
with changes in ﬁrms’ characteristics show that sales agents reduce ﬂows
sensitivity to returns and fees. As predicted by our model, after an increase
in fees or a reduction in expected returns, gifts oﬀered by sales agents in-
29crease to compensate the deterioration of PFA characteristics. The positive
and large coeﬃcient for sales agents show that sales agents by themselves
are an important determinant of net cross ﬂows (through gifts). The 1997
reform increased searching/switching costs and therefore reduced ﬂows’ sen-
sitivity to any change in ﬁrms’ characteristics, and moreover, it reduced the
eﬀectiveness of sales agents to induce switches through gifts.
Finally, using our empirical setup, it is easy to see that sales agents would
be even more important in the case of gross ﬂows. In this case the eﬀect of
sales agents from the two rival ﬁrms add up (they create in and outﬂows
at the same time), this is not the case for changes in ﬁrms’ characteristics
because they only produce ﬂows in one direction.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper provides a framework for the idea that sales agents promote
switching among plans (turnover) even when it is not socially eﬃcient, in-
creasing the administrative cost of the system. The paper shows that equilib-
ria with an excessive number of sales agents, and therefore excessive turnover,
can arise. Either the presence of searching costs or some degree of product
diﬀerentiation (e.g. expected return in the case of pension fund adminis-
trators) allows ﬁrms to charge a fee higher than their marginal cost. This
positive markup creates for ﬁrms an incentive to steal customers away from
their rivals (the stealing eﬀect).
In the model, sales agents help ﬁrms to steal customers. Using gifts
(bribes), sales agents are able to induce workers (customers) to switch from
one ﬁrm to another. A bribe can imply that even a rational worker may
switch from a high to a low quality product with the same marginal cost —a
completely ineﬃcient switch from a social point of view—. Firms are willing
to pay these bribes because price is above marginal cost and therefore they
still make proﬁts with these new customers.
30A comparison of the competitive equilibrium with the constrained Pareto
optimal case shows that the competitive equilibrium has too many sales
agents. This ineﬃciency comes from two causes. First, the stealing eﬀect
makes the private beneﬁt from hiring an extra sales agent bigger than the
social one. Therefore, the competitive equilibrium will allocate too many
sales agents to this industry. Second, sales agents, through bribes, can induce
ﬂows from high to low quality product, in the case of the Chilean pension
system from high to low expected return PFAs —a misallocation of ﬁnancial
resources-.
By applying this model to the Chilean pension system, we observe that
welfare might be improved by imposing restrictions to switching, which in
general might be thought of as an anti-competitive regulation. However, for
this to be the case, these restrictions should only involve switching through
sales agents; otherwise, overall switching or searching costs might be in-
creased and welfare reduced.
Finally, the empirical evidence shown in this paper supports the fact that
under measures that increase switching costs and reduce the eﬃciency of
sales agents, the number of sales agents in this industry and turnover are
reduced. However, there is no strong evidence in favor of more "eﬃcient"
switching between providers after the reform.
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35A Homogeneous Products: Extension to Long
horizon
This appendix studies the model introduced in section 3.1, now assuming a
long horizon (T period, where T tends to inﬁnity).
Proposition 7 If condition A holds (described in the next subsection) or
there is a positive searching cost, a SPNE is given by:22,23
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where β represents the discount factor.
Proof. Follows from the ﬁrst order conditions.
In this set up, the market share evolution is equal to:



















b), and they only depend in ﬁrms marginal costs. The higher
22It is important to note that in this equilibrium customers have zero surplus in each
period , no matter whether they swith or not. Consumer’s value function to stay in the
s a m eP F Ao rt os w i t c h( w i t has a l e sa g e n t s )a r ee q u a la ta n yt i m e .
23In the case we assume a positive searching cost, this is the unique markov equilibrium.
24The steady state is computed imposing that there is not net ﬂow between PFAs. In








36the relative marginal cost, the lower the market share. Once ﬁrms reach
the steady state shares there are not net ﬂo w sa n y m o r e ,b u tt h e r ei ss t i l l
turnover.
Condition for the long horizon model
This appendix describes the technical condition required to have a markov
SPNE in the long horizon model (Section 1.3.2), and proofs the uniqueness
of this equilibrium in the case in which there is a positive searching cost.
Condition A
As u ﬃcient condition to have the equilibrium described by equations [28-
30] as a SPNE for any initial market share in the case there is no searching
cost, ie. s=1, is:25
θSC > (R − ci)+( βV(σi,o =1 )− V (σi,o =0 ) ) ∀i = a,b (32)
where V (σi,o) represents the value function of ﬁrm I if it has an initial
market share equals to σi,o. After some algebra, and assuming the equilibrium
described in the previous subsection, equation [32] can be rewritten as:







































If this condition hold, equations [28-30] describe the equilibrium in the
long horizon model whatever are the parameters in the model.
If θ
0
SC =0 and w =( R − ci)/2 ∀i, the previous condition becomes:
θSC
w > 1 + ln(2)(1 + β/2).
25We assumes that R>c I,o t h e r w i s eﬁrms I would never produce in this market.
37BD a t a
All the information comes from the Superintendencia de Fondos de Pensiones
(SAFP). The data was taken for the period 1994-2000. SAFP not only col-
lects PFA’s monthly balance sheets but also has records of the number of
contributors in each ﬁrm and the number of transfers between PFAs and
constructs reports on returns and fees. In addition, twice a year (December
and March),26 the SAFP constructs distribution of contributors in each PFA
in terms of wages earned and cumulated funds each year. We construct the
distribution for June and September interpolating those pieces of informa-
tion. With the available data we construct observations for each December,
March, June and September since December 1995 until December 1999. The
constructed variables are:
• Quarterly gross ﬂow from PFA h to j: Sum of three months ahead
gross ﬂows from h to j. For March 1996 we use cross ﬂows observed
between May and July 1996. This is because the transfer process takes
three months and a switch decided in March can be concretized only on
June. We use three months average to reduce noise. Whenever there
is a merge between two PFAs, we use the sum of the two ﬁrm ﬂows as
if they were just one.
• Variation in ﬁrms characteristics: Variations in ﬁrms characteristics are
taken between the current month t and a one year moving average that
ends a quarter before t . For example, March 1996 changes in PFA j0s
characteristics is the diﬀerence between data for that PFA in March
1996 and the average of the characteristic during January 1995 and
December 1995.Whenever there is a merge between two PFAs, we esti-
mate the past characteristics as the sum of both ﬁrms’ characteristics
for the case of advertisement and information system services and the
weighted average for the case of fees and returns (using contributors as
26In 1999, the SAFP computed distributions in June instead of March.
38a weight). We measure PFA’s advertisement as a monthly stock vari-
able with a depreciation rate of 50% per year (in 108 Sep95$). Service
is a stock variable constructed with expenditure in information technol-
ogy (in 108 Sep95$). Fee is calculated as the three-month ahead PFA
ﬁxed fee plus variable fee multiplied by worker wages (in 103 Sep95$).
Expected Return is computed as the last 12-month average rate of re-
turn informed by the SAFP multiplied by the amount of fund hold by
the worker in the system (in 103 Sep95$). Workers’ wages and funds
are taken from the distribution of customers in each PFA.
We use the previous variables to construct the relative changes in ﬁrms
characteristics used in table [1]. We compute the relative changes as the
change in PFA j0s characteristic between to and t minus the same changes
for PFA h. For advertisement and services we use the log change.
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